During oral arguments in the case of Louisiana v. Callais, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson of the Supreme Court invoked a noteworthy comparison that has since stimulated extensive discourse. On Tuesday, while deliberating on voting rights protections, she equated the difficulties encountered by black American voters to the obstacles faced by individuals with disabilities. The case focuses on the constitutionality of Louisiana’s congressional map, which includes two majority-black districts, and whether it constitutes racial gerrymandering.
The bone of contention lies with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and its potential conflict with the 15th Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Plaintiffs argue that race was an improper factor in the creation of the congressional map. This case carries significant weight as it could influence how states approach the consideration of race in redistricting processes.
Justice Jackson's analogy stemmed from a discussion about whether discriminatory intent is necessary for a practice to be considered unlawful under civil rights laws. She drew parallels to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), stating that Congress enacted the ADA to make public spaces accessible to people with disabilities, regardless of whether exclusion was intended by those who designed the buildings. She suggested that discrimination in effect was more pertinent than intent, a principle she believes should analogously apply to voting rights.
Justice Jackson used the term "disabled" in both a literal and metaphorical sense, referencing past Supreme Court precedent. She argued that Congress has the power to remedy discriminatory effects in voting systems, even if there was no intent to discriminate.
Attorney Edward Greim, representing the case before the Court, countered Justice Jackson's analogy, emphasizing that remedies under the ADA do not perpetuate stereotypes. He argued that while physical accommodations are straightforward, assuming how individuals will vote based on race is fundamentally different and could lead to stereotyping.
As the debate continued, Justice Jackson questioned whether Greim's stance implied that racial issues could not be addressed with race-related solutions. She expressed concern that without race-conscious remedies, discrimination in voting would remain unresolved.
Greim clarified his position, differentiating between race-related remedies and those that stereotype voters. He maintained that recognizing racial disparities does not equate to assuming voting preferences based on race, which is where he sees constitutional issues arising.
The justice’s comments, and the ensuing debate, underscore the complexities and sensitivities involved in addressing racial disparities within the framework of voting rights and civil rights legislation. The implications of this case are far-reaching, potentially affecting the interpretation and application of the Voting Rights Act and how racial considerations are factored into the redistricting process.
